If You Can\u27t Beat \u27Em, Reform \u27Em: Expanding Oversight of Privately-Operated Immigrant Detention Centers by Rollins, Katherine
Mitchell Hamline Law Review 
Volume 46 Issue 4 Article 1 
2020 
If You Can't Beat 'Em, Reform 'Em: Expanding Oversight of 
Privately-Operated Immigrant Detention Centers 
Katherine Rollins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rollins, Katherine (2020) "If You Can't Beat 'Em, Reform 'Em: Expanding Oversight of Privately-Operated 
Immigrant Detention Centers," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 46 : Iss. 4 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open 
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, 
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu. 
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
 
IF YOU CAN’T BEAT ‘EM, REFORM ‘EM: EXPANDING 
OVERSIGHT OF PRIVATELY-OPERATED IMMIGRANT 
DETENTION CENTERS 
Katherine Rollins* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 924 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY ........................................................... 925 
A. The History of Immigrant Detention ...................................... 926 
1. Ellis Island ......................................................................... 926 
2. Angel Island ...................................................................... 928 
3. The Switch from Parole to Detention............................... 930 
a. Haitian and Cuban Migration and the Federal 
Government’s “Solution” ......................................... 931 
b. The Cold War by Proxy and Resulting Migration ...... 933 
c. The War on Drugs ...................................................... 934 
4. The Passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) ............................ 935 
5. The Effect of 9/11 on Immigrant Detention Policies ....... 937 
B. The Privatization of Detention Centers ................................... 940 
C. Human Rights Abuses at Immigrant Detention Centers ......... 941 
III. ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 944 
A. Current Oversight Mechanisms & Standards .......................... 945 
1. Use of Inspection Waivers ................................................ 947 
2. Flores Settlement .............................................................. 948 
B. Proposed Oversight Mechanisms ............................................ 949 
1. Whistleblower and Anti-Retaliation Law Reform............. 950 
a. Texas ........................................................................... 953 
b. Minnesota and the Future of the Federal Statute ....... 954 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 957 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2019, Governor Gavin Newsome of California signed a bill 
barring the state’s department of corrections from entering into or renewing 
contracts with private corporations to run state prisons and immigrant 
detention centers beginning January 1, 2020.1 Citing a lack of oversight and 
                                                           
*Katherine Rollins, J.D. Candidate 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author is 
a second-year, first generation law student whose parents instilled in her a passion for 
progressivism. She is grateful for the unwavering support from all the people in her life and 
1
Rollins: If You Can't Beat 'Em, Reform 'Em: Expanding Oversight of Private
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
2020] IF YOU CAN’T BEAT ‘EM, REFORM ‘EM 925 
an improper weighing of profit maximization over livable conditions, 
California will completely ban the incarceration of inmates in privately-run 
facilities from 2028 onward.2 Of the 9,000 individuals currently detained in 
California’s privately-run facilities, approximately 4,000 are immigrants in 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention.3 Illinois, Nevada, 
and New York imposed bans similar to California’s.4 It is estimated that as 
many as seventy-three percent of immigration detainees are housed in 
privately-run facilities nationally.5 This means that the beneficial impact of 
this legislation will mostly be seen by immigrant communities. 
While state legislatures battle with the legality of private immigrant 
detention centers, this article proposes an expansion and strengthening of 
federal whistleblower protections to increase oversight and improve 
conditions at the remaining facilities nationwide. Part II discusses the history 
of immigrant detention in the United States and the impact of detention on 
short-term and long-term detainees. Part III analyzes the standards and 
current oversight mechanisms applicable to immigrant detention centers 
and proposes that—in addition to legislation specifically aimed at improving 
detention center standards—whistleblower reform generally will help to 
protect the civil liberties of detainees. Finally, Part IV looks to the future of 
immigrant detention centers and the United States’ influence on global 
immigration policy.  
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Immigration detention in the United States is not new.6 Throughout 
our country’s history, and up to present day, pressure from nationalist 
movements has led to exclusionary immigration laws and high detention 
                                                           
for the attorneys, activists, and community members fighting for the rights of immigrants 
every day. The author thanks Professor Pottratz Acosta for her guidance and mentorship. 
Prior to joining Mitchell Hamline as an Assistant Teaching Professor, Professor Pottratz 
Acosta worked in immigration law for twelve years. 
1 Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers, 
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-prisons/california-
bans-private-prisons-and-immigration-detention-centers-idUSKBN1WQ2Q9 
[https://perma.cc/UCW5-YP4T].  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/private-prisons-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/B9S4-EYLP]. By comparison, inmates in state and federal privately-run 
prisons amounted for only about 8.2% of the total prison population. Id. 
6 See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 5 (4th ed. 2016). 
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rates.7 Starting as early as the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
United States government has singled out and precluded groups of people 
from entering the country based on arbitrary ideas of who is worthy enough 
to reside in our country—let alone participate in our democracy.8 
A. The History of Immigrant Detention 
The first federal restrictions on immigration arose in the nineteenth 
century after the Civil War and provided for the exclusion of convicts and 
sex workers.9 Following an increase in immigration from Asia, Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act,10 the Public Charge Law of 1882,11 and 
the Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885 as part of an expansive effort to curb 
migration from that part of the world.12 After the turn of the century, more 
than twenty million immigrants came to the United States looking for work, 
led by the development of industry in American cities.13 With another influx 
of immigrants also came additional legislation categorically restricting 
immigration on the basis of ideology, nationality, health, and mental 
disabilities.14  
1. Ellis Island 
Ellis Island, known as the “Golden Door”15 to the United States, was 
both an institution that welcomed immigrants processed there and a 
detention center for those who were unlucky enough to fall into any of the 
                                                           
7 See id.; Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 200 (2019) (“The Trump Administration’s immigration policies 
reflect its white nationalist rhetoric. The Administration has issued a dizzying array of policy 
changes that explicitly target or disproportionately affect noncitizens of color at the same time 
that President Trump’s statements reflect racist intent.”). 
8 Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 7, at 200.  
9 BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 5; Page Law, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974).  
10 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).  
11 Public Charge Law, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). This law also excluded “any convict, 
lunatic, [or] idiot . . . .” Id.  
12 See Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885); see also Louis Anthes, 
The Island of Duty: The Practice of Immigration Law on Ellis Island, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 563, 569 (1998).  
13 See BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 6.  
14 Id. at 6, n.25.  
15 See Emma Goldman, Immigration and Deportation at Ellis Island, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/goldman-immigration-and-
deportation-ellis-island/ [https://perma.cc/T3PG-QW3K] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020). 
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restricted categories of persons at the time.16 First opened in 1892, Ellis 
Island operated, though intermittently, until 1954.17  
Initially, Ellis Island was an enforcement tool for federal statutes 
enacted in the prior decade and this enforcement power was later 
strengthened by the Immigration Act of 1891 and the creation of the Bureau 
of Immigration.18 The Immigration Act of 1891 not only created additional 
restrictions on who could enter the United States but also provided for the 
inspection of immigrants upon their arrival to the United States.19 Inspection 
officers were “to take and consider testimony touching the right of any such 
aliens to enter the United States, all of which shall be entered of record.”20 
While a seemingly straightforward directive, together the Public Charge Law 
of 1882 and the Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885 created contradictory 
admission standards for entry into the United States. The Public Charge 
Law prohibited “any person unable to take care of himself or herself without 
becoming a public charge,”21 while the Anti-Contract Labor Law made it:  
unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation . 
. . [to] in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration 
of any alien or aliens . . . under contract or agreement . . . made 
previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens, 
foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in 
the United States . . . .22 
In effect, hopeful immigrants were confronted with a contradictory 
situation: they had to demonstrate they could both support themselves 
                                                           
16 See History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV.: ELLIS ISLAND (last updated May 8, 2018), 
https://www.nps.gov/elis/learn/historyculture/index.htm [https://perma.cc/KXM7-4HDJ] 
(“For the vast majority of immigrants, Ellis Island truly was an ‘Island of Hope’—the first stop 
on their way to new opportunities and experiences in America. For the rest, it became an 
‘Island of Tears’—a place where families were separated and individuals were denied entry 
into to the United States.”); Ellis Island History, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY-ELLIS ISLAND 
FOUND., https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/ellis-island-history [https://perma.cc/4KT9-
DHTJ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (“First and second class passengers would disembark, 
pass through Customs at the piers and were free to enter the United States. The steerage and 
third-class passengers were transported from the pier by ferry or barge to Ellis Island where 
everyone would undergo a medical and legal inspection.”). 
17 See id. The facility was closed for three years after a fire in 1897, and again during World 
War I when it was used by the United States military. Id. 
18 See Kevin Jennings, Yes, Your Ancestors Probably Did Come Here Legally—Because 
‘Illegal’ Immigration is Less Than a Century Old, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-jennings-legal-illegal-immigration-20180114-
story.html [https://perma.cc/FF5U-M3PX]. 
19 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 (1891). 
20 Id. 
21 Public Charge Law, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). 
22 Anti-Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885).  
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financially (or be supported by relatives) and that they did not have a job, 
and therefore a source of income, prearranged.23 Those that failed the 
inspection process were detained until an exclusion hearing was held by the 
Board of Special Inquiry.24 Evidence collected by inspectors created a 
presumption in favor of exclusion, but immigrants could present new, and 
even directly contradictory evidence, to overcome that presumption.25  
Overall, about twenty percent of those inspected at Ellis Island were 
temporarily detained.26 While the Immigration Act of 1891 provided that 
detainees are “to be properly housed, fed, and cared for,”27 over 3,500 
immigrants died in the hospital on the island.28 After the passage of the 
Emergency Quota Act of 192129 and the Immigration Act of 1924,30 the 
number of immigrants processed through Ellis Island slowed to a trickle, 
and the facility eventually transitioned into a detention center for prisoners 
of war in World War II.31 
2. Angel Island  
On the other side of the country in San Francisco, hopeful immigrants 
had a much different experience.32 Angel Island opened in 1910 to primarily 
house Chinese immigrants awaiting inspection.33 Separated by nationality, 
travel class, and perceived health, poor and Asian migrants were taken from 
the passenger ships to Angel Island for processing and to await interviews 
                                                           
23 See Anthes, supra note 12, at 574.  
24 See id. at 580. 
25 Cf. id. at 581. Interestingly, the immigrants who appealed to the Board of Special Inquiry 
without hiring representation fared better than those who did hire representation. See id. at 
583. Anthes analyzed 424 cases before the Board and found that unrepresented immigrants 
won about three-fifths of their cases, while represented immigrants only won about two-fifths 
of the time. Id.  
26 Goldman, supra note 15.  
27 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1085 (1891). 
28 Caitlin Johnson, Remembering the Dark Side of Ellis Island, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2007), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remembering-the-dark-side-of-ellis-island/ 
[https://perma.cc/KJ8E-BN3E]. 
29 Emergency Quota Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, 5 (1921) (“[T]he number of aliens of any nationality 
who may be admitted under the immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall 
be limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident 
in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910.”). 
30 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (establishing consular processing and 
further restricting immigration on the basis of national origin). 
31 See Goldman, supra note 15. 
32 History of Angel Island Immigration Station, AIISF, https://www.aiisf.org/history 
[https://perma.cc/TQ9Q-KSDW] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020). 
33 Id. 
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with federal officials, which were more like interrogations.34 Some interviews 
lasted days, testing applicants’ knowledge of the intimate details of their 
lives, and were meant to root out and deport Chinese immigrants who lied 
about meeting the criteria for exempt status under the Chinese Exclusion 
Act.35 Inconsistencies in testimony could put both the applicant and any of 
his or her family members in the United States at risk of being deported.36 
While the exact numbers relating to immigrant detention at Angel 
Island are unknown (the Administration Building, along with all of its 
records, burned down in 1940),37 it has been estimated that the average 
length of detention for all arrivals in San Francisco (including those who 
were not sent to Angel Island at all) was 7.1 nights.38 Living conditions at 
Angel Island were poor, as detainees were denied anything more than 
minimal recreation time and fed rations that were “barely edible.”39 The 
poor conditions in the barracks were evidenced by the poems etched into 
the wooden walls.40 One detainee wrote: 
Imprisoned in the wooden building day after day, 
My freedom withheld; how can I bear to talk about it? 
I look to see who is happy, but they only sit quietly.  
I am anxious and depressed and cannot fall asleep. 
The days are long and the bottle constantly empty; 
 my sad mood, even so, is not dispelled. 
                                                           
34 Id. 
35 Id.; Exclusion of Chinese Laborers Act, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476, 476 (1888) (repealed 1943) 
(“Chinese officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure or curiosity, shall 
be permitted to enter the United States, but in order to entitle themselves to do so, they shall 
first obtain the permission of the Chinese Government, or other Government of which they 
may at the time be citizens or subjects.”). Exclusionary policies continued through the turn 
of the century and included the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, in which the 
United States government “agreed to pressure the San Francisco authorities to withdraw the 
measure, and the Japanese Government promised to restrict the immigration of laborers to 
the United States.” Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900–1922, 
OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2016), 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations [https://perma.cc/45J3-
ZRY6]; see also Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 875–76 (1917) (providing 
that “the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States 
. . . unless otherwise provided for by existing treaties, persons who are natives of islands not 
possessed by the United States adjacent to the Continent of Asia . . . or who are natives of 
any country, province, or dependency situate on the Continent of Asia . . . .”). 
36 AIISF, supra note 32.  
37 Id. 
38 Robert Barde & Gustavo J. Bobonis, Detention at Angel Island: First Empirical Evidence, 
30 SOC. SCI. HIST. 103, 113 (2006).  
39 AIISF, supra note 32. 
40 Id.  
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Nights are long and the pillow cold; who can pity my loneliness? 
After experiencing such loneliness and sorrow, 
Why not just return home and learn to plow the fields?41 
Despite the fire in 1940, Angel Island was still used to detain 
immigrants during World War II.42 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many 
Japanese immigrants living in Hawaii were sent to the mainland; about 600 
of those individuals were detained at Angel Island and labeled as “enemy 
aliens.”43 After the war ended, the detention center was abandoned by the 
United States’ military and remained that way until it was established as a 
California state park.44 
3. The Switch from Parole to Detention 
From the closure of Ellis Island in 1954 until the early 1980s, the 
federal government generally opted for alternatives to detention of 
immigrants.45 “Physical detention of aliens [was then] the exception, not the 
rule, and [was] generally employed only as to security risks or those likely 
to abscond.”46 One of the most commonly used alternatives at the time—
parole—is defined as “a device that allows a person’s physical admission to 
the United States, yet treats the person in a legal sense as if he or she were 
still at the border seeking admission.”47 While parole is a form of statutory 
                                                           
41 Unknown Author, Poem 43, in ISLAND: POETRY AND HISTORY OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS 
ON ANGEL ISLAND, 1910–1940 68 (University of Washington Press 2d ed. 2014). 
42 AIISF, supra note 32. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1955) (“The total 
number of aliens detained during the year was only 184,000, of which 173,000 were Mexican 
nationals who were detained for extremely brief periods pending their return to Mexico.”); 
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1960) (“6,694 aliens were 
taken into custody under warrants of arrest. . . . At the end of the fiscal year, 6,976 aliens 
under proceedings were on bond, supervision, or released on their own recognizance.”); 
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1965) (“There were 17,041 
aliens initially admitted to Service detention facilities and 29,918 to non-Service facilities.”); 
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1970) (“There were 94,053 
aliens initially admitted to Service detention facilities and 121,670 to non-Service facilities.”); 
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1975) (“Aliens admitted to 
Service and non-Service facilities during fiscal year 1975 numbered 109,138 and 103,888 
respectively.”); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1982) 
(“During this period, 229,135 aliens were admitted in detention: 143,616 to these INS 
facilities and 85,519 to non-Service facilities.”).  
46 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (holding that immigration parole is 
merely used to avoid needless detention of immigrants and does not constitute a change in 
status).  
47 BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 11 n.48; see id. at 36; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 
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relief still available today, it is a discretionary decision left up to the attorney 
general.48  
a. Haitian and Cuban Migration and the Federal Government’s 
“Solution” 
Starting in the early 1970s, Haitians began making their way to Florida 
in order to escape a repressive dictatorship.49 At that time, refugee status was 
primarily granted only to those fleeing communist governments.50 The 
Refugee Act of 1980, however, expanded the definition of “refugee” to align 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention51 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees,52 allowing for a grant of conditional status for individuals 
“who [are] unable or unwilling to return to [their country] because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”53  
However, to circumvent the newly enacted law and to deter further 
migration from Haiti, the federal government began by first classifying those 
fleeing the Haitian Duvalier regime as economic migrants, making them 
                                                           
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). After the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the discretion to parole now also lies with DHS and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit 
Parole for Individuals Outside the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVS. (last updated Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-or-
significant-public-benefit-parole-individuals-outside-united-states [https://perma.cc/NDB3-
VYDR]. 
49 GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DETENTION POLICIES AFFECTING 
HAITIAN NATIONALS 1 (June 16, 1983); Carl Lindskoog, How the Haitian Refugee Crisis 
Led to the Indefinite Detention of Immigrants, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/04/09/how-the-haitian-
refugee-crisis-led-to-the-indefinite-detention-of-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4R-SQ2S].  
50 See Immigration and Nationality Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 913 
(1965). This amendment also provided for conditional status for individuals fleeing “the 
general area of the Middle East.” 
51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 
(“[T]he term refugee shall apply to any person who: . . . As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country . . . .”). 
52 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 
(expanding the definition of refugee to individuals persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion after January 1, 
1951). 
53 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980).  
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ineligible for asylum.54 In contrast, after thousands of Cubans sought asylum 
in the Peruvian embassy in Cuba, President Jimmy Carter invited them to 
seek refuge in the United States.55 In the summer of 1980, the relatively 
gradual influx of migrants grew into a crisis as more than 100,000 Cuban 
and 15,000 Haitian nationals arrived in the United States.56 Newcomers 
were held in detention centers, which were established by the Carter 
administration, while they were processed.57 The majority of Cubans were 
released on parole after processing, while the remaining were held to await 
deportation.58 Haitians, on the other hand, were deemed to lack ties to the 
community and, for the most part, remained in detention.59 During this time 
period, approximately 1,620 immigrants were held in detention daily.60 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan started a program meant to deter 
illegal immigration, part of which “provided for detention of aliens involved 
in or awaiting exclusion proceedings as [a] means of restricting employment 
opportunities.”61 The change in policy led to “critical” overcrowding at 
detention centers in South Florida.62 At one infamous facility, Krome North, 
as many as 1,530 detainees were housed in a space meant for 524 people.63 
An Immigration and Naturalization Service official noticed substantial 
                                                           
54 See Lindskoog, supra note 49. 
55 Yvette M. Mastin, Comment, Sentenced to Purgatory: The Indefinite Detention of Mariel 
Cubans, 2 THE SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 137, 142–43 (2000). As 
a result of the invitation, Fidel Castro opened Cuba’s borders to allow Cubans to travel to 
the United States. Id. at 143. After thousands of Cubans began their journey to southern 
Florida, “the Mariel Cubans became the victims of a propaganda campaign that made them 
appear dangerous and undesirable.” Id. at 144. Despite reports that many of the Mariel 
Cubans were “convicts, robbers, murders, homosexuals and prostitutes,” the large majority 
were paroled to families or other support groups. Id. at 145, 146. Yet, the nation’s view of 
these immigrants remained largely negative, resulting in the continued detention of excluded 
Cubans “to await further evaluation.” Id. at 146.  
56 Id. 
57 See Lindskoog, supra note 49.  
58 See Mastin, supra note 55, at 144. Another example of the preferential treatment of Cubans 
included the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which allowed admitted Cuban nationals to 
apply for lawful permanent residence status after residing in the United States for just one 
year. See Cuban Refugees, Adjustment of Status Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 
1161, 1161 (1966).   
59 GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6 (“Haitian nationals 
were disproportionately affected by the detention action—in terms of both the numbers 
detained and the length of detention.”). 
60 See Emily Kassie, Detained, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/24/detained [https://perma.cc/W6ES-XASH]. 
61 GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6.  
62 See id. at 18.  
63 Id.  
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issues in living conditions at Krome North, including an inadequate supply 
of clothing, inoperable washing machines due to sewage capacity, 
“debilitating idleness,” “severe” dental problems, and lack of shade.64 
Detainees were affected physically and mentally, as noted by Red Cross 
representatives who “concluded that mental disorders [were] one of the 
principal medical problems” detainees faced, and these “problems were a 
factor of the length of confinement and could not be resolved by improved 
detention conditions.”65 The daily average number of immigrants subject to 
these conditions reached 2,868 in 1982.66 
b. The Cold War by Proxy and Resulting Migration 
Ever worried about the spread of Marxism, the Reagan administration 
provided support to the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala fighting 
a leftist movement and to the contra rebels in Nicaragua fighting against the 
socialist Frente Sandinista.67 As a result, the increasingly violent civil wars led 
an estimated one million Central Americans to make the journey to the 
United States.68 Declining to label the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
governments as violators of human rights (and therefore labeling the United 
States as a human rights violator by proxy), the Justice Department and the 
INS overwhelmingly denied asylum to Salvadorans and Guatemalans.69 
Instead, Central American migrants arrested at the United States-Mexico 
border were detained, pressured into voluntarily departing, or were 
deported without access to legal services.70 
In an attempt to deal with the overcrowding and pressure from 
lobbyists, the Reagan administration sought help from the new private 
prison industry to open and run additional immigrant detention centers.71 
The United States’ first privately-run immigrant detention center opened in 
Texas in 1984 and was owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation 
                                                           
64 Id. at 18–19. 
65 Id. at 20–21. 
66 See Kassie, supra note 60. 
67 See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 




69 Id. (“[A]pproval rates for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases were under three 
percent in 1984. In the same year, the approval rate for Iranians was sixty percent, forty 
percent for Afghans fleeing the Soviet invasion, and thirty-two percent for Poles.”) 
70 Id. 
71 Michael Flynn, There and Back Again: On the Diffusion of Immigration Detention, 2 J. 
ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 165, 171 (2014). 
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of America.72 That same year, the daily average number of immigrants held 
in detention reached 3,380.73 
c. The War on Drugs 
President Richard Nixon declared a “war on drugs” in 1971, but it was 
not until the rise of the Medellin cartel and the election of President Reagan 
that the war on drugs truly ramped up.74 First Lady Nancy Reagan 
introduced her “Just Say No” campaign in 1984, and two years later, 
President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.75 In addition to 
the bill’s arguably most controversial provision, which established 
mandatory minimum sentences, it expanded the drug-related offenses that 
could result in a finding of inadmissibility or deportability.76 Moreover, the 
bill also enabled local law enforcement to communicate with INS if it 
believed it had arrested a non-citizen for a drug-related offense.77 
                                                           
72 Id. at 171 n.8. The Corrections Corporation of America is still in business today, renamed 
CoreCivic—one of the largest private detention companies in the country. See Smita Ghosh, 
How Migrant Detention Became American Policy, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/19/how-migrant-detention-became-
american-policy/ [https://perma.cc/YYG2-386M]. 
73 See Kassie, supra note 60.  
74 See Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NPR (Apr. 2, 2007), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 [https://perma.cc/BMN3-
VJ3T]. 
75 Id.; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
76100 Stat. 3207 at 47. Grounds of inadmissibility apply to individuals who are seeking to 
enter the United States at a border or port of entry, and to those who are looking to adjust 
their immigration status, like when applying for a “green card.” See BOSWELL, supra note 6, 
at 30–31. Grounds of deportability, on the other hand, apply when a noncitizen has been 
formally admitted to the United States and may face removal to their country of origin. Id. 
at 30.  
77 Section 1751 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides:  
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, 
if the official (or another official)—(1) has reason to believe that the alien may 
not have been lawfully admitted to the United States or otherwise is not lawfully 
present in the United States, (2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or 
employee of the Service authorized and designated by the Attorney General of 
the arrest and of facts concerning the status of the alien, and (3) requests the 
Service to determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer to detain the 
alien, the officer of employee of the Service shall promptly determine whether 
or not to issue such a detainer. If such a detainer is issued and the alien is not 
otherwise detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney General 
shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien. 
100 Stat. 3207 at 47–48.   
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Further escalating the impact of the drug war on immigrants, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 mandated detention of non-citizens convicted of 
an aggravated felony, which at the time was defined as “murder, any drug 
trafficking crime . . . or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive 
devices . . . .”78 This “aggravated felony” rule not only applied to 
undocumented immigrants, but to individuals who were in the United States 
legally.79 After serving their criminal sentences, these immigrants were then 
taken into custody by immigration officials.80 
With more enforcement, the population of detainees continued to 
grow, and it expanded faster than the federal government could build livable 
detention facilities and hire adequate personnel.81 In 1989, the average daily 
population of immigrants in INS custody reached 6,438.82 As a result, 
detention centers started using tent-like structures to house immigrants, and 
reports of abuse by INS and private security officers in detention facilities 
were not uncommon.83 
4. The Passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) 
Between 1988 and 1996, new immigration laws were marketed as 
focusing on increasing opportunities for legal immigration. The 
Immigration Act of 1990, for example, increased the quota numbers for 
employment-based and family-based immigration, and it created the visa 
program for highly skilled workers and the diversity visa lottery that is still 
in use today.84 This law also granted Temporary Protected Status for 
Salvadoran nationals living in the United States.85 Up to this point, non-
citizens with a final removal order could not be detained longer than six 
months.86 Yet, after the passage of the 1990 law, non-citizens labeled as 
“aggravated felons” were exempt from this six-month limit.87 However, anti-
                                                           
78 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181, § 7342 (1988). 
79 Id. (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony upon completion of the alien’s sentence for such conviction.” (emphasis added)). 
80 Id.  
81 See Kassie, supra note 60. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 See 27 Pub. L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978, 4986–5001 (1990). 
85 Id. at 5036–38. 
86 See Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, ACLU, (2020) 
https://www.aclu.org/other/analysis-immigration-detention-policies [https://perma.cc/FVB4-
JFX3]. Unless the detainee was obstructing deportation, they had to be released under 
supervision after this six-month limit was reached. Id.  
87 Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990). 
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immigrant sentiment continued to spread, especially after the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing,88 as shown by California’s passage of Proposition 
187.89  
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law what would become the 
groundwork for the immigrant detention apparatus that we have today.90 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)91 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)92 
greatly expanded the use of detention for immigrants by broadening the 
definition of “aggravated felony” and by introducing the expedited removal 
process.93 Prior to the passage of IIRAIRA, an average of 6,785 immigrants 
were held in detention daily.94 Just after the passage of IIRAIRA, however, 
the daily number of immigrants in detention nearly doubled to 11,871, and 
                                                           
88 See Kassie, supra note 60. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing killed six people, and 
more than 1,000 were injured. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts, CNN 
(updated Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-center-
bombing-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/M5QP-TDF4]. 
89 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (1995) (“The 
initiative’s provisions require law enforcement, social services, health care and public 
education personnel to (i) verify the immigration status of persons with whom they come in 
contact; (ii) notify certain defined persons of their immigration status; (iii) report those 
persons to state and federal officials; and (iv) deny those persons social services, health care, 
and education.”). Proposition 187 passed by a vote of 59 percent to 41 percent. Id. 
90 See Mandatory Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, 
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/mandatory-detention 
[https://perma.cc/GK36-6XMF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
91 Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1271 (1996) (“If the [asylum] officer determines at 
the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . the alien shall be 
detained for an asylum hearing before an asylum officer under section 208.” (emphasis 
added)).  
92 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-585 (1996) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien 
who—(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
212(a)(2), (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), (C) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) on 
the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of 
at least 1 year, or (D) is inadmissible under 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section 
237(a)(4)(B), when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on 
parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be 
arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” (emphasis added)). 
93 See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 90.  
94 Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal 
Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 6 (Sept. 
2009); cf. Immigration Detention 101, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, 
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101 [https://perma.cc/5SM6-
XGD8] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).  
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continued to rise.95 In addition to an increase in detainees generally, the 
average length of detention also increased, as migrants whose country from 
whence they came would not accept them back were held indefinitely.96 
More detainees also fell into this expanded definition of “aggravated felon,” 
making them exempt from the six-month limit on detention.97 In order to 
implement IIRAIRA, the INS had to work quickly to increase the capacity 
of immigrant detention and began relying heavily on private prison 
companies.98 
Yet, there did appear to be some public pushback on these restrictive 
policies. In the summer of 2001, the United States Supreme Court found 
that holding immigrants in detention indefinitely raised serious 
constitutional concerns.99 This decision, while meaningful at the time, would 
prove to be construed narrowly, applying only to migrants who had been 
ordered deported but did not have a country that would accept their 
repatriation.100 Shortly after that decision was issued, the United States would 
experience the worst terrorist attack in its history, perpetrated by foreign 
nationals who obtained valid visas, leading anti-immigrant sentiment to rise 
yet again.101 
5. The Effect of 9/11 on Immigrant Detention Policies 
Just as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center impacted 
immigration policy, the devastation of 9/11 led to an entire overhaul of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service that oversaw immigration and 
immigration enforcement.102 The first changes to the United States’ 
immigration system after 9/11 came from the USA PATRIOT Act.103 This 
Act greatly increased the number of border patrol agents and immigration 
                                                           
95 Kerwin & Yi-Ying Lin, supra note 94, at 6.  
96 See Kassie, supra note 60.  
97 See ACLU, supra note 86. 
98 Id. 
99 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite 
detention of aliens [who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered 
removed] would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an 
implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court 
review.”). 
100 Id. 
101 See Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration 
Policy and Program Changes in the Decade Since 9/11, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1 (Aug. 
2011). 
102 Id. 
103 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). 
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inspectors, led to the creation of an identification verification system for 
individuals entering the country, including the use of biometric tools, and 
permitted indefinite detention after obtaining a removal order.104  
Immediately following 9/11, and in the name of national security, 
immigrant detainees of “high interest” could not contact attorneys, and 
those deemed to be of “special interest” were subject to closed deportation 
hearings.105 Furthermore, the INS instituted a policy that allowed for 
immigrants to be detained without charge for forty-eight hours, or, if due to 
some extraordinary circumstance, for a reasonable period of time.106 After 
determining that al-Qaeda perpetrated the attacks, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), created in 2002, quickly instituted policies that 
focused on individuals arriving into the United States from countries where 
al-Qaeda was known or rumored to operate. It required men from twenty-
four Muslim-majority countries to register with legacy INS or the newly 
created DHS.107 Operation Liberty Shield, for example, while temporary, 
mandated the detention of asylum-seekers from such countries.108  
The United States’ Supreme Court upheld many of these new, 
seemingly unconstitutional policies, specifically noting that “[i]n the exercise 
of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”109 In Demore 
v. Kim, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not guarantee 
immigrant detainees the right to a bond hearing while awaiting their removal 
proceedings.110 As the dissent in that case points out, however, Kim was a 
lawful permanent resident at the time of his detention, and therefore, 
“entitled . . . to the safeguards of the Constitution . . . .”111 Further 
complicating the matter is the fact that a substantial number of immigrants 
in detention do not have final orders of removal.112 For example, in June of 
                                                           
104 Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 1; see also Boswell, supra note 6, at 18. 
105 Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 6; see National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), ARAB AM. INST. 
(2018), https://www.aaiusa.org/nseers [https://perma.cc/N9HY-X46N] (“More than 13,000 
men who complied with call-in registration were placed in removal proceedings.” (emphasis 
added)). 
108 Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7. 
109 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 
(1976)). 
110 Id. at 531. 
111 Id. at 544 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)). 
112 See CARL TAKEI ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHUTTING DOWN THE 
PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP 
USING PRIVATE PRISONS, 15 (Sept. 2016). 
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2016, “more than 25,000 of the 37,000 people in ICE detention” did not 
have such orders.113 
Arguably, the largest change after the 9/11 attacks was the creation of 
the DHS, a new cabinet-level agency approved by Congress in 2002 through 
the passage of the Homeland Security Act.114 DHS’s focus was national 
security, specifically “[p]reventing terrorist attacks and reducing vulnerability 
to terrorism in the United States.”115 With the creation of this agency, 
immigration enforcement and administrative functions of the INS, a sub-
agency of the Department of Justice, were transitioned to DHS. 116 
Additionally, DHS created three sub-agencies, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, to manage different immigration 
specific missions of the agency.117 In particular, CBP118 and ICE119 are the 
enforcement arms of the immigration apparatus, while Citizenship and 
Immigration Services handles the administrative arm and is tasked with 
“efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits.”120 
The REAL ID Act of 2005121 is most commonly known by the general 
public as having changed the standards for state identification cards.122 
However, it also made substantial changes to judicial review and jurisdiction 
in immigration cases.123 Further, the Act greatly increased the burden on 
asylum-seekers to show—not only that they have been or will be persecuted 
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
                                                           
113 Id. 
114 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see also 




118 See About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.cbp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BK6B-UHWF] (“With more than 60,000 
employees, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, is one of the world’s largest law 
enforcement organizations and is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of 
the U.S. while facilitating lawful international trade and travel.”). 
119 See What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.ice.gov/overview [https://perma.cc/DAQ3-2G3J] (“ICE’s mission is to protect 
America from the cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security 
and public safety.”). 
120 See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus [https://perma.cc/8QZG-QUX8]. 
121 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005).  
122 See Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7.  
123 119 Stat. at 302–23. 
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social group, or political opinion—but that one of these grounds is the 
“central reason” for their persecution.124  
B. The Privatization of Detention Centers 
Since the first privately-run facility opened in 1984, the government’s 
reliance on private corporations to run the immigrant detention apparatus 
has continued to grow.125 Today, ICE utilizes and contracts with four types 
of adult detention facilities: service processing centers, contract detention 
facilities, dedicated Intergovernmental Service Agreement facilities, and 
non-dedicated ISA facilities.126 Service processing centers are owned and 
operated by ICE.127 Contract detention facilities are owned and operated by 
private corporations that contract with ICE.128 Both dedicated and non-
dedicated Intergovernmental Service Agreement facilities are operated by 
state or local governments under a contract with ICE, but the state or local 
governments may choose to further subcontract out to private 
corporations.129 Additionally, non-dedicated Intergovernmental Service 
Agreement facilities may house immigrant detainees with other populations 
of detained persons, such as inmates.130 Today, the majority of immigrants 
in detention are housed in facilities operated by private companies.131 The 
increased proportion of immigrants held in privately operated facilities, 
combined with the fact that such corporations are for-profit,132 has led to 
increased criticism from immigrant advocacy groups.133 
                                                           
124 Id. at 303. 
125 See Livia Luan, Profiting from Enforcement: The Role of Private Prisons in U.S. 
Immigration Detention, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/profiting-enforcement-role-private-prisons-us-
immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/JMH7-LJZD]. 
126 JOHN V. KELLY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS 





129 See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration 
Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 224, 225–26 (2019). 
130 KELLY, supra note 126, at 1. 
131 See Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention 
Data Yet. It’s Alarming., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-immigration-
detention-data-yet [https://perma.cc/QJ2R-5J8M]. 
132 See, e.g., CoreCivic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2017); The GEO Group, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2016). 
133 See generally TAKEI ET AL., supra note 112. 
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Generally, immigration detention facilities are not meant to be punitive 
but to provide merely civil detainment as immigrants await admission or 
orders of removal.134 However, most facilities are at least jail-like in nature, 
if not actual jails.135 The two largest private prison companies in the United 
States, CoreCivic, Inc. and the GEO Group, Inc., maintain contracts with 
ICE and had a combined value of $765 million in revenue as of 2015.136 
Despite the benchmarks these private prison companies agreed to meet, 
there is little transparency, and the goal of maximizing profits has often led 
to cutting corners, resulting in substandard conditions at many detention 
centers around the country.137 
C. Human Rights Abuses at Immigrant Detention Centers  
Much of the argument that supports keeping immigrants in custody as 
they await their proceedings has to do with public safety.138 But often, the 
individuals making those arguments fail to take into account the safety of 
the migrants in detention.139 Overcrowding in detention centers has led to 
                                                           
134 Id. at 8.  
135 Id. “With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were built, and 
operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons.” Id. (quoting Dora 
Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 2–3 (Oct. 6, 2009)).  
136 Id. at 10. 
137 Id. at 12–15.  
138 See, e.g., Why Immigration Detention is Necessary, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://cis.org/Fact-Sheet/Why-Immigration-Detention-Necessary 
[https://perma.cc/Y746-PMPX] (“[W]hile aliens [that are merely here illegally] don’t . . . 
represent the same kind of risk as alien criminals or national security threats, simply by 
volume they pose a real possibility of collapsing the nation’s system of immigration control 
if they are not dealt with effectively.”); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER, (July 14, 2019, 9:45 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1150400995177959427 
[https://perma.cc/Z45L-XL6F] (“The adult single men areas were clean but crowded – also 
loaded up with a big percentage of criminals……”). 
139 See CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, supra note 138.  
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss4/1
942 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:4 
inhumane conditions, condemned by human rights organizations,140 the 
United Nations,141 and even the United States government itself.142 
CBP facilities maintain temporary detention facilities to hold migrants 
who are arriving to the United States without proper documentation.143 
Border patrol agents and these facilities are often a migrant’s first encounter 
with the United States government.144 CBP facilities are meant for short-term 
detention, typically no longer than seventy-two hours, while the migrants 
undergo initial processing and are transferred to the custody of another 
agency.145 However, before these migrants can be released into the custody 
of other agencies, such as ICE or the Department of Health and Human 
Services, there must be space available at those agencies’ facilities.146 Yet, as 
the acting inspector general of the DHS has pointed out, “because both ICE 
and [Health and Human Services] are operating at or above capacity, CBP 
has experienced increasing instances of prolonged detention in its 
facilities.”147 
As these short-term facilities are now being used for long-term 
detention, some children and families have experienced limited access to a 
change of clothes and do not have access to showers or hot meals.148 At adult 
                                                           
140 See The Nightmarish Detention of U.S. Immigrants, AMNESTY INT’L (last visited Oct. 14, 
2019), https://www.amnestyusa.org/the-nightmarish-detention-of-us-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/4H8F-Y8H6] (“Investigative news reports have exposed a litany of human 
rights abuses in the detention facilities . . . . Amnesty International has launched a campaign 
to pressure our government to honor its human rights obligations. . . . The time has come 
for the U.S. government to apply the rule of law to those within its own borders.”); Human 
Rights Watch, US: Substandard Medical Care in Immigration Detention, YOUTUBE (May 
7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6a3t61tffI [https://perma.cc/73YV-AMAE]. 
141 See Deanna Paul & Nick Miroff, U.N. Human Rights Chief ‘Deeply Shocked’ by Migrant 
Detention Center Conditions in Texas, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2019/07/08/un-human-rights-chief-deeply-
shocked-by-migrant-detention-center-conditions-texas/ [https://perma.cc/4NZN-TS24] 
(“The high commissioner singled out the treatment of migrant children, saying she was 
‘deeply shocked that children are forced to sleep on the floor in overcrowded facilities, 
without access to adequate healthcare or food, and with poor sanitation conditions.’”). 
142 See generally JENNIFER L. COSTELLO, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., MANAGEMENT ALERT—DHS NEEDS TO ADDRESS DANGEROUS OVERCROWDING AND 
PROLONGED DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY 
(REDACTED) (July 2, 2019).  
143 Id. at 3. 
144 See CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics [https://perma.cc/D2LD-
JBJY] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
145 COSTELLO, supra note 142, at 3 n.5. 
146 Id. at 3. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 6.  
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facilities, the inspector general found that some detainees were held in 
confinement that allowed for standing room only, sometimes for a week.149 
Further, some adults did not have access to a shower for as long as a month, 
and were instead given “wet-wipes to maintain personal hygiene.”150 
Additionally, meals provided to single adults did not take into consideration 
any dietary restrictions and many had been fed only bologna sandwiches, 
leading to digestive issues.151  
The conditions at ICE detention centers, which are meant for longer 
lengths of stay, have also been heavily criticized.152 Starting at intake, some 
detention centers required a strip search of all detainees, in violation of the 
standards set by ICE, which require “‘reasonable suspicion’ based on 
‘specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe 
that a specific detainee is in possession of contraband.’”153 Furthermore, the 
center in question was not documenting these strip searches, making it 
impossible to determine whether the strip search was warranted upon 
review.154 Detainees reported delayed medical care, even for painful 
conditions, “such as infected teeth and a knee injury.”155 During inspections, 
some facilities were observed to have mold in the bathrooms, no hot water, 
and leaking pipes.156 Hygienic supplies were in limited supply, and in some 
instances, detainees “were advised to purchase more at the facility 
commissary.”157 Food appeared spoiled, and standard food handling 
procedures were not followed.158 There are also reports of detainees held in 
solitary confinement for as much as twenty-two hours a day, for days or 
weeks at a time.159 
                                                           
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 8–9.  
151 Id. at 9. 
152 See generally KELLY, supra note 126. 
153 Id. at 4.  
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 7.  
156 Id.  
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 8 (“We observed spoiled, wilted, and moldy produce and other food in kitchen 
refrigerators, as well as food past its expiration date. We also found expired frozen food, 
including meat, and thawing meat without labels indicating when it had begun thawing or the 
date by which it must be used. Finally, at one facility, we observed food service workers not 
wearing required nets to cover facial hair to ensure food safety.”). 
159 Maryam Saleh & Spencer Woodman, A Homeland Security Whistleblower Goes Public 
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To make matters worse, detainees who complained about conditions 
at some facilities were retaliated against, and in facilities operated by private 
corporations, detainees had limited contact with ICE officers to whom they 
could report their concerns.160 In alleging mistreatment by guards, improper 
discipline,161 or even just poor living conditions, detainees have little 
recourse if there is not a proper procedure for handling these complaints. 
Federal employees who reported maltreatment in detention centers faced 
silence, isolation, and bureaucratic red tape.162  
III. ANALYSIS 
Until immigration policies that emphasize deterrence and detention 
are changed, the number of immigrant detainees will likely continue to 
grow. With large government contracts at stake, the corporations that run 
these detention centers will continue to lobby for punitive measures for the 
undocumented.163 In 2018, GEO Group and CoreCivic, Inc, the two largest 
players in the private prison industry, spent over $4 million on political 
contributions and lobbying efforts.164 Their substantial political power has 
led to a lack of transparency and accountability, requiring substantial 
reform.  
                                                           
160 KELLY, supra note 126, at 5.  
161 Id. at 6 (“Staff did not always tell detainees why they were being segregated, nor did they 
always communicate detainees’ rights in writing or provide appeal forms for those put in 
punitive lock-down or placed in segregation. . . . [O]ne detainee reported being locked down 
for multiple days for sharing coffee with another detainee.”). 
162 See Saleh & Woodman, supra note 159.  
163 While lobbying efforts focus on the detaining “illegal immigrants,” there are multiple 
reports of lawful permanent residents and even United States citizens winding up in 
immigration detention. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re An American, But What If 
You Had to Prove It Or Be Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/22/504031635/you-say-you-re-an-
american-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-or-be-deported [https://perma.cc/9WS7-T6D7]; 
Brittny Mejia, It’s Not Just People In the U.S. Illegally—ICE Is Nabbing Lawful Permanent 
Residents Too, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
lawful-resident-20180628-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Q97B-TU4C]. 
164 Yuki Noguchi, Under Siege and Largely Secret: Business That Serve Immigration 
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A. Current Oversight Mechanisms & Standards 
Of the 211 immigrant detention facilities, only five are directly owned 
and operated by ICE.165 ICE maintains that “[t]hrough a robust inspections 
program, ICE ensures detention facilities used to house ICE detainees do 
so in accordance with ICE national detention standards.”166 However, these 
standards may differ depending on whether the facility is operated by ICE 
or by a private corporation.167 Incentivized by shareholders to maximize 
profit, private corporations have and will continue to negotiate for the least 
costly standards to apply.168 As such, detainees in those facilities will be 
subjected to noticeably worse living conditions. Furthermore, “twenty-two 
percent of immigrant detention centers are smaller detention centers which 
were permitted to conduct their own inspections, known as Organizational 
Review Self-Assessments,”169 reducing the impact of any incentive to 
maintain habitable conditions, let alone conditions that live up to the 
standards set by ICE. 
An in-depth analysis of the differences of these negotiated standards is 
beyond the scope of this article. It is important to illustrate, however, how 
different the standards are. The least stringent of the federal detention 
standards utilized by ICE and the private corporations contracted to operate 
ICE detention facilities is the 2000 National Detention Standards (2000 
NDS).170 As of 2018, twenty-four percent of immigrant detainees are held in 
facilities that are inspected according to this standard.171 The Pests and 
Vermin provision of these standards is a useful comparison. The 2000 NDS 
required facilities to bring in “licensed pest-control professionals to perform 
monthly inspections” to “identify and eradicate rodents, insects, and 
                                                           
165 JOHN V. KELLY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE DOES NOT 
FULLY USE CONTRACTING TOOLS TO HOLD DETENTION FACILITY CONTRACTORS 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR FAILING TO MEET PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 3 (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/OIG-19-18-Jan19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28SQ-ESRZ]. 
166 Facility Inspections, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) 
https://www.ice.gov/facility-inspections [https://perma.cc/WJ8W-5TEX]. 
167 Id. (“Depending on the negotiated contract or agreement, detention facilities that house 
ICE adult detainees operate under one of three sets of ICE detention standards.”). 
168 See Investor Relations, CORECIVIC, INC., http://ir.corecivic.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/2P6B-K2NA] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (“[CoreCivic, Inc.] is a diversified 
government solutions company with the scale and experience needed to solve tough 
government challenges in cost-effective ways.”). 
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vermin.”172 These standards also required “a preventative spraying program 
for indigenous insects.”173 
In 2008, ICE sought to revise its detention standards, and “in 
coordination with agency stakeholders,” released the 2008 Performance-
Based National Detention Standards (“2008 PBNDS”).174 Thirteen percent 
of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities that are inspected under this 
standard.175 The Pests and Vermin provision of the 2008 PBNDS improved 
slightly since the 2000 NDS, requiring a “provision for callback services as 
necessary,” in addition to the monthly inspections and preventative 
spraying.176 A similar provision is incorporated into the Family Residential 
Standards released by ICE in 2007.177 
ICE revised its standards yet again in 2011, this time “incorporat[ing] 
the input of many agency employees and stakeholders, including the 
perspectives of nongovernmental organizations and ICE field offices.”178 In 
2016, ICE further revised this iteration of the detention standards to remain 
in line with federal laws and regulations.179 These standards are considered 
the most stringent standards applicable to immigration detention facilities180 
as sixty-three percent of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities held to 
these standards.181 As for the prevention of pests and vermin after these 
revisions, the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards now 
also require that “[d]oors to the outside should be tight fitting and door 
                                                           
172 2000 Detention Operations Manual, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 9 (Sept. 20, 2000), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/envirom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AWH5-2YJF].  
173 Id.  
174 2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) https://www.ice.gov/detention-
standards/2008 [https://perma.cc/59NR-4U2V]. 
175 See Cullen, supra note 131. 
176 2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 4 (Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-
standards/pdf/environmental_health_and_safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3Z9-F3EK].  
177 Family Residential Standards, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 18 (Dec. 21, 2007), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/family-
residential/pdf/rs_environmental_health_andZ_safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S2J-L3HA]. 
178 2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) https://www.ice.gov/detention-
standards/2011 [https://perma.cc/C4M9-RUUG]. 
179 Id. 
180 See Cullen, supra note 131. 
181 Id. 
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sweeps should be installed.”182 Such a requirement may require renovation 
of facilities, making it unlikely for private prison companies to agree to such 
standards when there are lesser standards considered acceptable to ICE.  
1. Use of Inspection Waivers 
Detention facility compliance with contracted standards is monitored 
through Office of Detention Oversight inspections, Nakamoto Group, Inc. 
inspections, and Custody Management’s Detention Service Manager 
inspections.183 If it is determined that a facility is deficient in some way, the 
Custody Management division of the Enforcement and Removal 
Operations office will typically work with the facility to determine a plan to 
correct the deficiency.184 However, the DHS’s Office of Inspector General 
found that this process is ineffective in holding facility contractors 
accountable.185 For example, during the inspection process, “a facility can 
assert that it could not remedy the deficiency because complying with the 
standard can create a hardship, because of a conflict with a state law or a 
local policy, a facility design limitation, or another reason” and apply for a 
waiver to Custody Management.186 
Even with this limited guidance, the DHS Office of Inspector General 
found that “ICE has no formal policies and procedures to govern the waiver 
process and has allowed ERO officials without clear authority to grant 
waivers.”187 Between September 2016 and July 2018, ninety-six percent of 
these waiver requests were approved, “including waivers of safety and 
security standards.”188 Further, it was found that waivers rarely had an 
expiration date, allowing facilities to circumvent detention standards 
indefinitely.189 One of the most egregious waivers ICE granted allowed a 
contracted facility to use a tear gas that was ten times more toxic than the 
pepper spray allowed by the contracted standard.190 The conclusion of the 
DHS Office of Inspector General report gave ICE multiple 
                                                           
182 2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 21 (revised Dec. 2016), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/2011/1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/88AX-X7D7].  
183 See KELLY, supra note 165, at 5–6. 
184 See id. at 5, 9. 
185 Id. at 7.  
186 Id. at 9.  
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 10.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. (“Custody Management granted a waiver authorizing a facility (a CDF [Contract 
Detention Facility]) to use 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS gas) instead of the OC (pepper) 
spray authorized by the detention standard.”). 
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recommendations to increase compliance in these contracted facilities, 
including imposing financial penalties for failure to maintain standards, 
finalizing a procedure for waiver approval, and increasing the number of 
contracting officers’ representatives who oversee day-to-day operations at 
these facilities.191 ICE appeared receptive to the recommendations, but DHS 
Office of Inspector General declined to close any of its recommendations 
until further steps were taken by ICE to improve compliance and 
oversight.192 
2. Flores Settlement 
The Flores Settlement Agreement (Flores Settlement) was signed in 
1997 and arose out of a class action lawsuit brought by the American Civil 
Liberties Union on behalf of immigrant children who were detained by the 
INS.193 The lawsuit sought to change INS’s treatment of children in 
detention and the timing of their release from detention.194 Some groups 
argue that the Flores Settlement created a “loophole” in our immigration 
laws, loosening asylum rules and driving up the number of “apprehended 
aliens who claim credible fear (the first step in applying for asylum) . . . up 
over 10-fold from a decade ago.”195 The Flores Settlement, however, focuses 
almost exclusively on the conditions of detention facilities in which children 
are held, the care they should receive there, and when and to whom they 
should be released.196 The Flores Settlement was meant to be a temporary 
solution to give time for legacy INS, and later the DHS, to pass final 
regulations relating to juvenile immigrant detention.197 To this day, the Flores 
Settlement remains the basis for juvenile detention standards, but lacks 
                                                           
191 Id. at 15. 
192 Id. at 18–20. ICE’s response to each recommendation by DHS OIG was that it “concurred 
with the recommendation.” Id. 
193 See Rebeca M. López, Codifying the Flores Settlement Agreement: Seeking to Protect 
Immigrant Children in U.S. Custody, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1635, 1648 (2012).  
194 Id. at 1648–49. 
195 See Matthew Sussis, The History of the Flores Settlement: How a 1997 Agreement 
Cracked Open Our Detention Laws, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement [https://perma.cc/42KJ-SX5D].  
196 See Abbie Gruwell, Unaccompanied Minors and the Flores Settlement: What to Know, 
NCSL: THE NCSL BLOG (Oct. 30, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/30/unaccompanied-minors-and-the-flores-settlement-
agreement-what-to-know.aspx [https://perma.cc/UT34-9H28].  
197 See López, supra note 193, at 1650.  
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enforcement mechanisms and is at substantial risk of being terminated 
altogether.198 
The Trump administration proposed ending the Flores Settlement as 
a way to keep immigrant families together in detention.199 Arguing that, 
because Flores requires that children must be released after twenty days in 
detention, DHS must separate families, releasing the children while parents 
or other family members stay in custody, in order to comply with the terms 
of the agreement.200 There are, of course, other options the administration 
could and should consider, like releasing the family unit as a whole on 
parole or supervised release, for example. Indeed, the practice of 
conducting initial credible fear screening and releasing family units from 
detention within twenty days has been used successfully since 2015, with 
over ninety percent of families complying with ICE check-in appointments 
and attendance at court hearings after their release from detention.201 Pulling 
out of the Flores Settlement altogether would likely result in children 
needlessly being held in custody indefinitely in unsafe and unsanitary 
conditions with little, if any, recreational or educational programs, risking 
severe mental and physical harm to these children as a result.202 As the Flores 
Settlement has not yet been codified, the risk of an anti-immigrant 
administration withdrawing from the agreement remains.203 
B. Proposed Oversight Mechanisms 
Immigration reform has been a long-standing bipartisan goal, but 
exactly what “immigration reform” means differs widely between the 
                                                           
198 See id. at 1661; Katie Reilly & Madeleine Carlisle, The Trump Administration’s Move to 
End Rule Limiting Detention of Migrant Children Rejected in Court, TIME (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://time.com/5657381/trump-administration-flores-agreement-migrant-children/ 
[https://perma.cc/6HGG-DFSM].  
199 Id.  
200 Id. Regardless of these proposed rule changes, any changes to the Flores Settlement, 
including through regulation, would have to be approved by Judge Dolly Gee, the overseer 
of the settlement. See Maria Sacchetti, Federal Judge Blocks Trump Administration from 




201 Fast Check: Asylum Seekers Regularly Attend Immigration Court Hearings, HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/fact-check-asylum-
seekers-regularly-attend-immigration-court-hearings [https://perma.cc/7FQW-RPKY].  
202 See Reilly & Carlisle, supra note 198. 
203 López, supra note 193.  
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parties.204 Those on the right would place enforcement of current 
immigration laws higher on the priority list, which would include an 
expansion of border security and increasing exclusions and deportations.205 
Those on the left would like to see a focus on creating a “path to citizenship” 
for undocumented immigrants currently in the United States, clearing the 
wait list of visa applicants, and deporting only those who have committed 
criminal offenses.206 These differences in priorities make comprehensive 
immigration reform difficult to negotiate and implement and ultimately 
leads to the question: Are there reforms that are politically feasible, in that 
they do not touch directly on immigration, but that would, in effect, reform 
our immigration policies?  
1. Whistleblower and Anti-Retaliation Law Reform 
Whistleblowing is an important and underutilized mechanism of 
reform, both in the private and public sector.207 In the article, Combating 
Corruption: The Development of Whistleblowing Laws in the United 
States, Europe, and Armenia, authors David Schultz and Khachik 
Harutyunyan point to four main justifications for whistleblowing.208 
Generally, these justifications boil down to exposing bad behavior, 
reforming entire organizations, and seeking justice by exposing wrongdoers 
and holding them accountable.209 Despite protections, however, 
                                                           
204 See Theresa Cardinal Brown, Getting to Enactment: The Political Obstacles to 
Immigration Reform, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/political-obstacles-to-immigration-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/W83D-ST6C].  
205 Id.  
206 Id. 
207 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of 
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 183, 199 (2007); Daniel Van Schooten, Gov’t 
Watchdog Finds Flaws in Implementation of Contractor Whistleblower Law, PROJECT ON 
GOV. OVERSIGHT (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2017/03/govt-watchdog-
finds-flaws-in-implementation-of-contractor-whistleblower-law/ [https://perma.cc/NAP5-
XCG9].  
208 David Schultz & Khachik Harutyunyan, Combating Corruption: The Development of 
Whistleblowing Laws in the United States, Europe, and Armenia, 1 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 87, 
88 (Dec. 2015), 
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2351667415000141?token=9925E3D4C213B97
4A6F07B809C42B6C67F7A294161B8B51833C4E646D0A4351EAF88CADA8A1004FE
FE785F374F15415D [https://perma.cc/U98S-KSK9].  
209 Id. 
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whistleblowers are often afraid to come forward, fearing adverse 
employment consequences or hostility from their co-workers.210  
For employees of the federal government, whistleblowers are 
protected by the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).211 To 
succeed with a whistleblower reprisal claim under the WPA, the employee 
must show that he or she made a protected disclosure, the disclosure was a 
contributing factor in a personnel action, and that the person who made the 
personnel action had knowledge of the disclosure.212 If the employee is 
successful in meeting this burden, the agency can still avoid liability if it can 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the personnel action would have 
been taken regardless of the protected disclosure.213 This statute does not 
apply, however, to employees of federal contractors.214 
In 2016, Congress passed legislation that many lauded as a substantial 
expansion of federal whistleblower law by broadening permanent protection 
to employees of federal contractors.215 It also provided a private right of 
action in the event of retaliation against whistleblowers but charging 
employees must first exhaust all administrative remedies available to them 
under the statute before an action may be brought against the contractor in 
federal court.216 Furthermore, employees are only protected from reprisal 
for disclosing information that the employee:  
                                                           
210 Starting in October 2019, similar hostility has been directed at a federal government 
whistleblower by the President of the United States. Despite following the procedure as 
required by the statute, this anonymous whistleblower is experiencing significant pressure for 
their good faith effort to expose what many consider to be blatant corruption. See Dennis 
Wagner, Trump’s Allies Want to ID the Whistleblower, Who May Learn the Price of 
Speaking Out, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/11/06/impeachment-federal-
whistleblowers-face-retaliation-abuse/2497666001/ [https://perma.cc/T4ZD-MHK4].  
211 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).  
212 Id.; see also Mark P. Cohen & John J. Lapin, The United States of America: Federal 
Whistleblower Protection, COMMITTING TO EFFECTIVE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION, 
OECD 203 (Mar. 16, 2016), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/committing-to-
effective-whistleblower-protection_9789264252639-en#page201 [https://perma.cc/XP6K-
JCSX#page201].  
213 See Cohen & Lapin, supra note 212, at 203–04.  
214 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
215 See 41 U.S.C. § 4712; Anna C. Haac, Federal Contractor Whistleblowers Now 
Permanently Protected from Retaliation, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-contractor-whistleblowers-now-permanently-
protected-retaliation [https://perma.cc/EWR9-7NGP]. Congress initially passed this law in 
2013 as a temporary pilot program that was to last four years. Act of Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 
1632, 1837–41 (2013). The 2016 legislation made this permanent. 
216 41 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(2).  
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reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a 
Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse 
of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial 
and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, 
rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract . . . or grant.217 
As evidenced by the proposed Whistleblower Act of 2019,218 it is 
unclear whether the 2016 legislation includes protections for subcontractors 
and subgrantees.219  
The United States Office of Special Counsel, the agency with 
jurisdiction over whistleblower complaints from federal employees, typically 
releases such complaints and related agency reports when the cases have 
been closed.220 The Office of Special Counsel does not, however, handle 
complaints by employees of federal contractors.221 Employees of federal 
contractors must instead make their “complaint to the Inspector General of 
the executive agency involved.”222 The Inspector General is only required to 
investigate if it finds that the complaint is not frivolous and reports 
misconduct that meets the standard under the statute, and the employee’s 
complaint must not have been previously addressed.223 Since 2017, there has 
only been one investigative report released by the DHS relating to 
immigration functions within the department.224  
                                                           
217 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1). “The term ‘abuse of authority’ means an arbitrary and capricious 
exercise of authority that is inconsistent with the mission of the executive agency concerned 
or the successful performance of a contract or grant of such agency.” 41 U.S.C. § 4712(g)(1).  
218 S. 2315, 116th Cong. (2019). 
219 Id. 
220 Office of Special Counsel, Know Your Rights When Reporting Wrongs (rev. Mar. 2019), 
https://osc.gov/Documents/Outreach%20and%20Training/Handouts/Know%20Your%20R
ights%20When%20Reporting%20Wrongs%20Handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQC3-
CKWQ]. After initially disclosing the alleged wrongdoing, the Office of Special Counsel will 
interview the employee and evaluate the information to determine whether it is “substantially 
likely” that the complaint can be proven and whether it constitutes a severe enough violation 
of law or mismanagement to require the agency to investigate. If so, the agency will have to 
submit a report after an investigation, and the employee will then have an opportunity to 
respond. The report and comments are then sent to the President and Congress before being 
released to the public. Id.  
221 See 41 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(1). 
222 Id.  
223 Id.  
224 See Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Whistleblower 
Retaliation Reports of Investigation (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/whistleblower-retaliation-reports-of-investigation 
[https://perma.cc/LCS6-9RWE]. The report discussed allegations made by a Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) officer of racial profiling by CBP at the Port of Detroit. The 
complainant alleged that black Americans were more likely to be stopped and searched at 
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In addition to federal laws, states have enacted whistleblower 
protections with varying degrees of breadth and effectiveness. An analysis of 
every state whistleblower retaliation statute is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is important to note their potential impact in Texas, the state 
with, by and large, the highest population of immigrant detainees.225 This 
article also looks to the Minnesota Whistleblower Act as a potential model 
for federal reform.  
a. Texas 
For the fiscal year of 2018, Texas held almost 16,000 immigrants in 
detention each day.226 Comparatively, the state with the next highest number 
of immigrants in detention per day was California, at 6,527 detainees.227 
Many of the recent reports of unsanitary and inhumane conditions have 
come out of these Texas facilities, some operated by CBP and others 
operated by GEO Group and CoreCivic, Inc.228 With the relatively narrow 
whistleblower protections for federal employees229 and employees of federal 
                                                           
the border, even after informing CBP officers they approached the border in error. After 
reporting this to his supervisors, a letter of reprimand was placed in his file. The Office of 
the Inspector General concluded that this was in fact a violation of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Whistleblower Retaliation Report of Investigation, Office 
of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, No. I16-CBP-DET-17715 (Sept. 
29, 2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/whistleblower-retaliation-reports-of-investigation 
[https://perma.cc/LCS6-9RWE]. 
225 Detention by the numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS , 
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/2J23-LU9D] 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2020). 
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 See, e.g., Martin Garbus, What I Saw at the Dilley, Texas, Immigrant Detention Center, 
THE NATION (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/dilley-texas-immigration-
detention/ [https://perma.cc/6FQU-NBC6]; Amanda Holpuch, Migrant Children Held in 
Texas Facility Need Access to Doctors, Says Attorney, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/08/migrant-children-detention-center-texas-
attorney-health-crisis [https://perma.cc/AC5D-H263]; Maria Sacchetti, ICE’s Chief Called 
Family Detention “Summer Camp.” Here’s What it Looks Like Inside., THE TEX. TRIBUNE 
(Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/08/25/inside-ice-family-detention-
facility-texas/ [https://perma.cc/6D3C-N6Y4].  
229 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302 et seq. (“Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to 
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to authority . . . 
take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any 
employee or applicant for employment because of . . . any disclosure of information by an 
employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences . . . 
any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, 
an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss4/1
954 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:4 
contractors under federal law,230 such employees may instead try to look to 
state statutes in the event of retaliation after what they considered to be a 
protected report. Unfortunately, Texas’ whistleblower protections provide 
no additional recourse than that provided by federal law, as they apply only 
to employees of state or local governments or other public employers.231  
Furthermore, to be considered a “protected report,” it must be made 
in good faith and to “an appropriate law enforcement authority.”232 Texas 
courts have held that the “good faith” test is dual prong, requiring both a 
subjective and an objective component.233 Even if the Texas Whistleblower 
Act protected private employees from retaliation, it does not protect 
violations of internal policy or rules not “adopted pursuant to a statute or 
ordinance.”234 Furthermore, at least in the preemption context, “federal 
contracts do not qualify as ‘Laws.’”235 As such, it is unlikely that Texas courts 
would recognize a report of a violation of the standards promulgated by ICE 
or the Flores Settlement and contracted out to the privately-operated 
detention centers to be a protected report under Texas state law. The 
inadequacies of whistleblower protection under Texas state law speak to the 
necessary reform that is needed to federal whistleblower protections. 
b. Minnesota and the Future of the Federal Statute 
In contrast to both Texas and federal law, the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act gives much broader protections to whistleblowers.236 
Both private and public employees are protected from retaliation if they 
have “report[ed] a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation of any 
federal or state law or common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an 
employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.”237 
                                                           
disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically 
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the 
conduct of foreign affairs . . . .”). 
230 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4712. 
231 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002.  
232 Id.  
233 See Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996) (“‘Good faith’ means that (1) 
the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) the employee’s 
belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.”). 
234 Ruiz v. City of San Antonio, 966 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).  
235 See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration 
Federalism, STAN. L. REV. (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privatized-detention-immigration-federalism/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7WW-UNFW]. 
236 See generally MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2019). 
237 MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1).  
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While, like the Texas Whistleblower Act, the MWA does require the 
report to be made in good faith. However, the Minnesota legislature has 
defined “good faith” much differently than Texas courts.238 In Minnesota, a 
good faith report merely requires that the report not violate subdivision 
three of the MWA, which states, “This section does not permit an employee 
to make statements or disclosures knowing that they are false or that they 
are in reckless disregard of the truth.”239 The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
further clarified this definition by not requiring that the “putative 
whistleblower act with the purpose of exposing an illegality.”240 
Compared to the Texas Whistleblower Act and federal whistleblower 
statutes, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act goes the furthest to protect 
individuals who are looking to hold the organizations for which they work 
accountable, while still protecting the organizations themselves from 
lawsuits based on frivolous or false reports. Some—likely including those 
who passed the Texas whistleblower statute—would argue that the creation 
of broad governmental protections for those who are outing wrongdoing at 
private corporations is an unacceptable expansion of governmental power.241 
However, as government and the private sector continue to comingle 
through contractual relationships and lobbying efforts, it is important to 
ensure the public’s tax dollars are spent by those private entities in a way 
that aligns with our nation’s values and complies with applicable law. In 
addition to the accountability that is encouraged through governmental 
oversight, the individuals who work in those private corporations every day 
have intimate knowledge of day-to-day operations and can provide firsthand 
insight into any wrongdoing. 
The federal definition of the severity of the reported violation for the 
report to be protected must also be clarified and expanded. The statute 
currently requires that the violation must be “gross” or the public risk must 
be “substantial and specific.”242 With such a high bar, even among 
employees who witness severe violations that may rise to this level, few are 
likely to report wrongdoing for fear of retaliatory acts that have no recourse 
under the statute. Further, employees who witness minor violations will 
                                                           
238 Compare MINN. STAT. § 181.931, subdiv. 4 with Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 
784 (Tex. 1996).  
239 MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subdiv. 3.  
240 Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. 2017).  
241 See Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending 
a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1652 (2008) 
(“Another argument occasionally used to justify an external reporting requirement is that the 
employer-employee relationship is private and should thus be beyond the purview of the 
judicial system.”). 
242 See 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1). 
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likely refrain from making a report immediately, opting instead to wait until 
the violation rises to the level of severity defined by the statute, at which 
point, substantial damage may have been done to the persons affected by 
such wrongdoing. As seen in almost all fields, from healthcare to software 
development, prevention and early detection cost significantly less than 
reactive measures taken to correct the problem.243 Here, the costs involve 
human life and dignity, making it even more crucial that we take proactive 
measures to prevent and quickly correct violations of basic rights.  
The Minnesota Whistleblower Act’s definition of a protected report 
could be adopted at the federal level, in order to encourage the prevention 
and early detection of wrongdoing at the hands of federal contractors. 
Reports of even suspected violations of rules or laws, including common 
law, would encourage these contractors to enact and enforce the standards 
that we have asked of them and that they have agreed to. Until these 
standards are codified and with the proposed protections, employees could 
report violations of contracted standards under a breach of contract 
theory.244 Enhancing whistleblower protections is just one step towards 
reform of immigrant detention centers. Uniform standards should also be 
enacted nationwide, along with increased unannounced inspections, as 
proposed in the Dignity for Detained Immigrants Act of 2019.245 Enacting 
policies that encourage alternatives to detention would decrease the 
detained population and prevent overcrowding at detention facilities. Until 
that can occur, we must protect whistleblowers who help expose the 
                                                           
243 See, e.g., Bill Frist & Alice Rivlin, The Power of Prevention, U.S. NEWS (May 28, 2015), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/2015/05/28/focus-on-prevention-to-cut-
us-health-care-costs [https://perma.cc/RE2H-DTK9] (“Prevention can reduce the risk factors 
that lead to chronic diseases, slow their progression, improve overall health and reduce 
health care spending.”); Matt Warcholinski, The Cost of Quality in Software Development—
Is the Quality Worth It?, BRAINHUB, https://brainhub.eu/blog/cost-of-quality-in-software-
development/ [https://perma.cc/4SPT-HQD9] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (“[I]n software 
development quality should be planned and implemented, not inspected afterwards. The 
reason is in clear sight—the cost of preventing errors is less than the cost of correcting errors 
found on final stages or by customer complaints.”).  
244 See Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204–05 (Minn. 2000) (holding 
whistleblower reports must implicate a violation of federal or state law), superseded by 
statute, Minnesota Whistleblower Act, H.F. 542, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013), as 
recognized in Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. 
2017) (holding that the MWA does not require the whistleblower to “act with the purpose 
of exposing an illegality”).   
245 116 H.R. 2415, 116th Cong. (2019). This Act would require “the Secretary of Homeland 
Security [to], by rulemaking, establish detention standards for each facility at which aliens in 
the custody of the Department of Homeland Security are detained.” Id. at § 2. Furthermore, 
this Act would require yearly, unannounced inspections at every facility to ensure compliance 
with DHS’s standards. Id. at § 3.  
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corruption and abuse that has become commonplace in immigrant 
detention. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In an ideal world, rates of immigrant detention in the United States 
would fall to a level at which private prison companies are no longer needed 
and public detention centers are used only sparingly. Opting for alternatives 
to detention, such as release on recognizance, bond, or monitoring 
programs,246 and repealing IIRAIRA’s mandatory detention provision would 
likely get us to that point. As for the former, the DHS merely needs to 
change its policies. However, under the current administration, that is 
improbable.247 As for the latter, it is unlikely that any substantial immigration 
reform will occur anytime soon. In the meantime, proper oversight in 
immigrant detention centers, both public and private, is crucial to ensure 
detainees receive proper care. Expanding whistleblower protections on a 
federal level would benefit not only the immigrants in detention centers but 
would also promote transparency and efficiency. In turn, this would lead to 
better decision making and reduce corruption at all levels of government. 
                                                           
246 These options cost less to the American taxpayer, but most importantly, are far more 
humane. ACLU, Alternatives to Immigration Detention: Less Costly and More Human than 
Federal Lock-up, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_atd_fact_sheet_final_v.2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VFT8-8F58] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020). 
247 See generally Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 7. 
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